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Princeton,  N. J. 08544 The behavior of the U.S. economy in the two decades before the Great
Depression is of great interest to macroeconomists. Between 1909 and 1928 the
U.S. experienced a major war and whatappears to have been a severe postwar
depression. Because of these important macroeconomic events, thisperiod seems
to provide an interesting era for testing a variety of macroeconomic relation-
ships. As a result, existing estimates of gross national product for the 1910s
and 1920s have been used extensively in empirical research.However, research-
ers have typically given very little thought to whetherany of the available
GNP series provide an accurate indication of cyclical fluctuations in the
pre-1929 period.
By far the most widely used estimates of GNP for 1909-1928 are those
created by the Commerce Department.1 While the Commerce Departmentwarns that
these estimates are less reliable than the standard GNP estimates that become
available in 1929, most researchers presume that the officialgovernment series
is reasonably accurate, or at the very least is the best series available for
this period. Furthermore, because the Commerce Department series ispublished
in both Historical Statistics of the United States and Long-Term Economic
Growth, these estimates are often the most convenient series to use.
While the Commerce Department estimates are widely used, they are by no
means the only estimates of GNP available for this period. Indeed, they are
not even the only set of GNP estimates that are designed to be conceptually
consistent with the modern Commerce Department series on GNP. An alternative
Commerce concept GNP series for 1909-1928 is published by John W. Kendrick in
his book Productivity Trends in the United States (1961). While both the
Commerce Department and Kendrick series for 1909-1928 are supposed to use the-2-
same concepts and definitions as modern GNP data, the two prewar series are
very different from one another. Host importantly, the two series provide a
very different picture of the American economy in the five years surrounding
World War I. As a result, the two series yield very different findings when
they are included in empirical studies of macroeconomic relationships.
Since the Commerce Department estimates of GNP for 1909-1928 are quite
different from the Kendrick estimates, it is important to discover whether the
usual presumption in favor of the official government series is correct in this
case. The first purpose of this paper is to suggest that it is not. Rather,
the paper argues that the Kendrick series is better for three reasons. The
first is simply that the Kendrick series is newer than the Commerce Department
series. This is particularly relevant because John Kendrick is the person who
created the original Commerce Department estimates of GNP for 1909-1928 in the
early 1950s. Since the 1961 Kendrick series represents Kendrick's latest
version of his Commerce concept estimates of GNP, it is reasonable to presume
that these are the better estimates.
The second reason for preferring the Kendrick series is that it is not
only newer but also derived from superior data than the Commerce Department
series. From what one can discover about the creation of the two series, the
1961 Kendrick series appears to be on a more solid empirical base than the
original Commerce Department estimates. Host importantly, the Kendrick series
draws very heavily on the final Kuznets estimates of various components of
gross national product. The Commerce Department series, on the other hand, is
based on various series that predate Kuznets's work and in some instances uses
preliminary Kuznets estimates of certain components.
The third reason for preferring the Kendrick series is that it appears to
be more consistent with other reliable indicators of production for the-3-
pre-Depression era than is the Commerce Department series. Inyears when the
Kendrick and Commerce Department series differ mostdramatically, the behavior
of the Kendrick series is verified by the Shawseries on commodity output and
the Fabricant series on manufacturingoutput (see Shaw, 1947, and Fabricant,
1940)
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Since the Kendrick estimates of GNP for 1909-1928are superior to the
Commerce Department estimates, it is useful topresent these better estimates
in a readily usable and improved form. The secondpurpose of the paper is thus
to create a revised version of Kendrick's original series. Themost important
change that I make is to improve the underlying Kuznets estimates ofGNP for
1909-1918. I replace the standard Kuznets GNP series whichhas been shown to
be excessively volatile with a new series derived fromlittle-used Kuznets
estimates of national income.3 This change improves theaccuracy of the annual
Kendrick series for the 1910s.I also adjust the new Kendrick series to the
1982 base year now used by the Commerce Department in thecalculation of real
GNP.
The third and final purpose of thepaper is to examine how the revised
series changes one's impression of the pre-Depressionperiod.I find that the
new series shows both a much smaller wartime boom in 1918-1919 anda much less
severe postwar recession in 1921 than does the Commerce Department series.
This finding suggests that conventional beliefs about the effectof World War I
on the economy and the nature and cause of the postwar depression must be
reevaluated. Based on the revised Kendrick data, Iargue that wartime produc-
tion primarily substituted for domestic productionduring World War I and that
in 1921 the economy experienced a mixture of supply and demand shocks that
drove down prices dramatically but left outputessentially unchanged.-4-
This analysis of GNP for 1909-1928 is organized as follows. Section I
describes the history of the Kendrick and Commerce Department series. Section
II discusses the source of differences between the two series. Section III
evaluates the quality of the two series and suggests that the Kendrick series
provides a more accurate representation of annual movements in GNP than does
the Commerce Department series. Section IV presents revisions and improvements
to the standard Kendrick GNP series. Finally, Section V suggests that using
the better GNP estimates changes one's perception of the pre-1929 economy
dramatically.
I. HISTORY OF THE KENDRICK AND COMMERCE DEPARTMENT GNP SERIES
To evaluate the relative accuracy of the Kendrick and Commerce Department
GNP series for 1909-1928 it is useful to know the history of the two series.
The Commerce Department series was created in the early 1950s by John Kendrick
who was at that time an employee of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The
series was "created" in the sense that it is not based on survey data as are
Commerce Department estimates of GNP after 1929. Rather, Kendrick created
estimates of GNP by piecing together estimates of consumer expenditures,
investment spending, the change in inventories, and other components of GNP,
that were available from secondary sources. Kendrick's main contribution was
to provide estimates of government spending and to piece together the available
series in a way that approximated Commerce Department procedures.
The Commerce Department GNP series was first published in the 1958 publi-
cation U.S. Income and Output. The series was changed slightly in the 1965
revision of the National Income and Product Accounts. According to sources at
the Commerce Department, the 1965 revisions to Kendrick's original estimates
were due to efforts to carry certain definitional changes back in time.—5-.
However, the actual changes were very small and no substantive changes were
made in the key components of GNP such as consumer expenditures or investment.
The Commerce Department GNP series for 1909-1928 has remained essentially
unchanged since 1965 except for alterations in the base year for the estimates
of real GNP.
What is conventionally called the Kendrick series (or more properly the
Kendrick-Kuznets series) was first published in 1961. The final Kendrick
estimates share little in common with the Commerce Department series for
1909-1928. Rather than being pieced together from a variety of sources, the
final Kendrick series is based almost entirely on the final Kuznets estimates
of the various components of GNP (see Kuznets, 1961). Kendrick's contribution
was to reconcile the Kuznets estimates with Commerce Department procedures. In
making this reconciliation Kendrick presumably made some use of his earlier
estimates of government expenditure, since the treatment of the government
sector is a key difference between the Kuznets concept and the Commerce Depart-
ment concept of GNP.
From this brief history of the Commerce Department and Kendrick estimates
of GNP for 1909-1928 there is already a reason for preferring the Kendrick
series. This reason is that both series were created by the same person with
the same objective in mind, and the Kendrick series is the more recent of the
two series. John Kendrick created both series with the goal of forming esti-
mates of GNP for 1909-1928 that are consistent with modern Commerce Department
estimates of GNP after 1929. Since the series that bears his name was created
nearly ten years after the Commerce Department series, it is reasonable to
presume that this series represents Kendrick's best estimates of GNP.
A related reason for preferring the Kendrick series to the Commerce
Department series is that very little is known about how the Commerce-6-
Departmentseries was actually constructed. The Commerce Department has no
documentation (published or unpublished) on the creation of the GNP estimates
for 1909-1928 and John Kendrick has discarded his original worksheets. As a
result, all that researchers know about the creation of the Commerce Department
series is what John Kendrick remembers and what one can deduce from the indi-
vidual series available from the Commerce Department's records. Since even the
Commerce Department does not know how the series was constructed, it is impos-
sible to check whether the construction methods were sound. Hence, researchers
are largely ignorant about possible errors or biases in the Commerce Department
series.
The same is not true of the Kendrick-Kuznets estimates of GNP. In accor-
dance with the standards of the National Bureau of Economic Research, the
Kendrick revisions of Kuznets's estimates and the Kuznets estimates themselves
are meticulously documented. While such careful documentation may expose some
flaws in the estimates (see Romer, 1986b), researchers are certainly better off
knowing how the series was created. This knowledge enables them to determine
in what applications the series will be accurate and appropriate.
II.SOURCE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TIlE KENDRICKAND COMMERCE DEPARTMENT
GNPSERIES
To compare the quality of the Kendrickand Commerce Department GNP series,
it is useful to analyze the source of the difference between the two series.
Once we have isolated which components are the most different in the two
series, we can analyze which series provides the most accurate representation
of those components.
The first step in analyzing the source of the discrepancy between the
Kendrick and Commerce Department series is to examine the difference between
the two series at the aggregate level. Before one can calculate thesedifferences, however, it is necessary to ratio splice the Kendrick series to
the Commerce Department series.4 This procedure isnecessary for two reasons.
First, the Kendrick real GNP series is only available in 1929 dollars while the
Commerce Department real GNP series is currently calculated in 1982 dollars.A
ratio splice makes the two real series roughly comparable in levels.Second,
there have been some slight definitional changes in the modern CommerceDepart-
ment series since Kendrick created his Commerceconcept estimates of GNP in
1961. The changes have affected theaverage level of the Commerce Department
estimates of GNP, but have left both the trend and cyclicalproperties of the
series unchanged. A ratio splice of both the nominal and real Kendrick series
to the Commerce Department series incorporates these definitionalchanges into
the Kendrick series.
Actually doing the ratio splices is straightforward. In all cases I use
1929 as the year for calculating the necessary ratios. The ratiosplices are
carried out at two levels of aggregation. The real and nominal Kendrick series
are ratio spliced to the Commerce Department series at both the level of total
GNP and the level of the major components of GNP. The specificcomponents that
are spliced are consumption expenditures, new construction and equipment, the
change in business inventories, net foreign investment, and government purchas-
es of goods and services. Ratio splicing the Kendrick series in 1929 prices to
the Commerce Department series in 1982 prices at theaggregate level just
changes the average level of Kendrick's GNP estimates. It does not affect the
year—to-year movements of GNP because 1929 prices are still used to weight the
various components of GNP. Ratio splicing the Kendrick series at a disaggre-
gate level, however, can greatly alter the year-to-year movements because this
procedure genuinely uses 1982 prices to weight the various components of GNP.-8-
Once the Kendrick series for 1909-1928 is ratio spliced to the Commerce
Department series it is possible to analyze the discrepancy between the two
series. Table 1 shows the percentage difference between the Kendrick and
Commerce Department GNP series in current and 1982 dollars. The percentage
difference is calculated for the Kendrick series ratio spliced to the Commerce
Department series at both the aggregate and disaggregate level.
Importance of Relative Prices
One characteristic of the difference between the Kendrick and the Commerce
Department real GNP series apparent from Table 1 is that the difference varies
depending on whether the Kendrick series is spliced to the Commerce Department
series at the aggregate or disaggregate level. The real Kendrick series
spliced to the Commerce Department series at the aggregate level differs more
from the Commerce Department series than does the Kendrick series spliced at
the components level. This is most obvious in the years 1918 to 1920 when the
percentage difference between the Kendrick series spliced at the aggregate
level and the Commerce Department series is twice as large as the same discrep-
ancy using the Kendrick series spliced at the disaggregate level. This fact
suggests that a significant part of the difference between the standard
Kendrick series and the Commerce Department series on real GNP stems from the
fact that the Kendrick series is based on 1929 relative prices while the
Commerce Department series is based on 1982 relative prices.
The fact that using 1929 relative prices rather than 1982 relative prices
to form estimates of real GNP is an important source of the discrepancy between
the standard Kendrick series and the Commerce Department series on real GNP is
not surprising. Relative price changes have been quite dramatic over the last
50 years.5 Among the most important changes has been the rise in the price of
labor intensive items such as services and government production relative to-9-
other goods. This particular change explains why the Kendrick series basedon
1929 relative prices is so different from the Commerce Department series in
1918 and 1919. In these years government spending valued in 1929prices was
quite high due to World War I and its aftermath. When that spending is valued
in 1982 prices it is dramatically higher because the relativeprice of military
goods has risen over time. As a result, the Commerce Department estimates of
GNP in these years are much higher than the standard Kendrick estimates.
Importance of Consumption
While the use of different relative prices can explain some of the dis-
crepancy between the Kendrick series based on 1929 prices and Commerce Depart-
ment series based on 1982 prices, Table 1 shows that large differences remain
between the Kendrick series based on 1982 relative prices and the Commerce
Department series and between the two nominal series. A noticeable character-
istic of the remaining differences is that they are consistentlynegative and
declining in absolute value in the decade 1909-1919. This indicates that while
the average level of the Commerce Department series in this decade ishigher
than that of the Kendrick series, the trend growth rate of the Kendrick series
is greater. Another important characteristic of the remainingpercentage
differences is that they vary greatly from one year to another. This indicates
that the annual percentage changes in the Kendrick and Commerce Department GNP
series are often very different.
To identify the source of these remaining differences it is useful to
compare each major component of the two series to see which are the most
different and hence the most important. Table 2 presents the difference
between the major components of the Kendrick series valued using 1982 relative
prices and the Commerce Department series. It also gives the difference
between the major components of the two nominal series. In all cases the-10-•
differences in the components of the two series are expressed as a fraction of
the total difference between the Kendrick and the Commerce Department GNP
series.
Table 2 shows that while all of the components of the two series are
different, the differences are most pronounced in the consuniption series. The
difference in the consumer expenditure series in both real and nominal dollars
consistently accounts for a large fraction of the total difference between the
Kendrick and the Commerce Department GNP series. This is especially true in
years when there are large differences between the two GNP series. For exam-
ple, in 1921 when real GNP in the two series differs by $30 billion, 78 percent
of this discrepancy is accounted for by the consumption series. The fact that
both the real and nominal consumption series differ radically suggests that it
is differences in the level of nominal consumption and not differences in the
deflator series that accounts for differences between the Kendrick and Commerce
Department consumer expenditures series.
An examination of the consumption series underlying the Kendrick and the
Commerce Department GNP series shows that differences in the two consumption
series can account for the most noticeable characteristics of the discrepancy
between the two GNP series. Figure 1 shows a graph of consumer expenditures in
1982 dollars as measured by Kendrick and the Commerce Department. One obvious
difference between the two series is that the Commerce Department consumption
estimates are consistently higher than the Kendrick estimates in the decade
1909-1919, but have a much lower trend rate of growth. This is consistent with
the differences in trend growth shown in the aggregate GNP series.
A more important difference between the Kendrick and Commerce Department
consumption series is that the two series often move in different directions.
For example, consumption rises from 1919 to 1921 in the Kendrick series and—11-V
falls quite dramatically in the Commerce Department series. Similarly, between
1924 and 1925 consumption falls in the Kendrick series and rises steadily in
the Commerce Department series. These differences in annual movements in
consumer expenditures is consistent with the fact that the Kendrick and Com-
merce Department GNP series often exhibit very different short-run fluctu-
ations.
III. EVALUATING THE TWO SERIES
The previous section showed that the large discrepancy between the
Kendrick and the Commerce Department GNP series in severalyears between 1909
and 1928 is due primarily to differences in the relative priceweights used and
the consumption component of total output. Having identified themajor sources
of the discrepancy between the two GNP series, it isnecessary to analyze which
series provides the more accurate estimates of the factors in question.Only
by examining which relative price weights are appropriate and which consumer
expenditure series is correct, can one decide whether the Kendrick or the
Commerce Department series is the better series to use.
-
RelativePrices
The Commerce Department has chosen to create estimates of GNP for 1909-
1928 that are genuinely based on 1982 prices. The major components of GNP are
valued in 1982 prices and then combined to give estimates of total GNP. Thus,
1982 relative prices are used to weight the major components of GNP. Kendrick,
on the other hand, uses 1929 relative prices to weight the components in the
calculation of aggregate GNP. Ratio splicing the aggregate Kendrick series to
the Commerce Department series in 1929 yields a GNP series for 1909-1928 that
is still based on 1929 relative prices and that has percentage changes identi-
cal to the standard Kendrick series.-12—
The Commerce Department procedure cannot be faulted on technical grounds.
The procedure yields a GNP series that is consistent over time. This GNP
series shows what total output would have been in the period 1909-1928 if
relative prices had been what they were in 1982. The resulting series, howev-
er, may yield a distorted view of the changes in aggregateeconomic activity in
the period 1909-1928. Most importantly, if 1982 relative prices differ from
those in the years before 1929, changes solely in the composition of GNP will
result in changes in the level of real GNP measured in 1982 dollars.
This drawback is common to all fixed-weight measures of real GNP. Indeed,
to deal with this problem economists often argue in favor of using chain
weights in the calculation of realGNP.6 However, the drawback is particularly
severe in the case of the prewar Commerce Department estimates because the 1982
base year is so far from the period in question. Using 1982 prices to measure
real GNP in the l950s may not cause tremendous problems because relative price
changes within the postwar period have been reasonably small. On the other
hand, using 1982 prices to measure real GNP in 1910 is likely to yield distort-
ed estimates because relative price changes have in fact been quite large
between the prewar and postwar periods.
The amount of distortion caused by using 1982 relative prices to calculate
prewar GNP can be seen by examining the composition of GNPvalued in current
and 1982 prices. The fraction of GNP accounted for by each of the major
components of the real and nominal Commerce Department series are givenin
Table 3. These fractions show that using 1982 prices causes one to greatly
overemphasize the importance of the government sector. Using 1982 relative
prices also causes one to exaggerate the importance of investment spendingin
the prewar era. Government spending and investment spending are consistently a-13-
smaller fraction of total GNP when valued in current (or 1929) prices than when
valued in 1982 prices.
The distortion that results from using 1982 prices to value prewar GNP
could be quite important when these estimates are used to investigate a variety
of economic relationships. For example, studies of productivity could produce
strange results because the composition of employment is much different from
the composition of GNP valued in 1982 prices. This will be especially true in
the years around World War I when government spending valued in 1982 prices
jumps much more dramatically than does employment. Using the Commerce Depart-
ment GNP series will lead one to misjudge the amount of technological change in
this period and in general to overstate the effect of the war on theeconomy.
Using 1982 prices to weight GNP could also yield a GNP series that is exces-
sively volatile. If one believes that investment spending tends to be one of
the more volatile components of GNP, then using 1982 weights which accentuate
the size of that sector will make the Commerce Department real GNP series more
volatile than is actually correct.
The same reasons for explaining why using 1982 weights to construct prewar
estimates of real GNP is not desirable can be used to justify Kendrick's
procedure of using 1929 relative price weights. While 1929 is toward the end
of the prewar era, relative prices in the period 1909-1928 are quite close to
those in 1929. As a result, the 1929 base year does not lead to estimates of
prewar GNP that distort the composition of total output. This can a-lso be seen
in Table 3, which shows the fraction of GNP accounted for by each major compo-
nent of the Kendrick series valued in current and 1929 prices. The fraction
accounted for by each component is remarkably similar for the current and
constant dollar series.-14-
Cons umpt ion
The previous evidence suggests that one important source of the discrep-
ancy between the Kendrick and the Commerce Department series, differences in
base years, should lead researchers to prefer the Kendrick series to the
Commerce Department series. Using 1929 prices to form the estimates of GNP for
1909—1928 is more sensible than using 1982 prices. It remains to be seen,
however, whether the other significant source of the discrepancy between the
two GNP series, differences in the underlying consumption estimates, also
favors the Kendrick series over the Commerce Department series
History. The history of the two consumption series provides some evidence
in favor of the Kendrick series. According to John Kendrick, the consumer
expenditure estimates now attributed to the Commerce Department were derived
from consumption estimates presented in a study by J. Frederick Dewhurst and
associates entitled America's Needs and Resources (1947).8 The Dewhurst volume
is itself a collection of secondary sources. The notes to the table where the
Dewhurst series is given say only "gross national product and consumer expendi-
tures (Commerce) are based on unpublished Kuznets data" (Dewhurst, 1947, p.
696). However, the numbers given by Dewhurst do not correspond to any numbers
that Kuznets eventually published.'0 Also, they do not match up with the
unpublished numbers that underlie the five-year moving averages of Kuznets's
final series that are given in Capital in the American Economy (1961). Hence,
one must conclude that the unpublished Kuznets series used by Dewhurst is some
intermediate version of Kuznets's final estimates.
In contrast to the Commerce Department series, the Kendrick series on
consumer expenditures for 1909-1928 is based almost entirely on the final
Kuznets estimates of consumption. Kendrick took the final Kuznets estimates
and revised them to follow Commerce Department procedures. The main revision-15-
centers on the treatment of government expenditures. Unlike the Commerce
Department, Kuznets does not include all government expenditures ingross
national product. Rather, he only includes thosepieces of government expendi-
ture that directly enter the flow of goods toconsumers or capital formation.
Kendrick's main revision to the Kuznets consumerexpenditure series involves
removing the government expenditure component from the Kuznetsconsumption
series and then incorporating this quantity in hisown comprehensive figures on
total government expenditures.
From the information available about the construction of theCommerce
Department and Kendrick estimates of consumer expenditures for1909-1928, it
appears that the Kendrick series is better. The Commerce Department series is
based on preliminary Kuznets estimates of consumerexpenditures. The Kendrick
series is based almost entirely on the final Kuznets estimatesof consumption.
If one presumes that Kuznets's final estimatesare better than his preliminary
estimates, then the Kendrick series is clearly better than the CommerceDepart-
ment series on GNP for 1909-1928.
Methods. While the presumption that Kuznets's final estimates ofconsump-
tion are more accurate than his preliminary estimates isreasonable, it is
possible to make a more objective assessment of the relativequality of the two
series. Because the final Kuznets estimates aremeticulously documented, it is
possible to see if the methods used to derive them are sound. If the methods
are sound, then it is possible to conclude that the Commerce Departmentcon-
sumption series, which is very different from the Kuznets series, must be
flawed.
The methods that Kuznets uses to derive estimates ofconsumption, and
indeed gross national product, differ for the decades before and after 1919.
After 1919 GNP is estimated using the income-paymentsapproach. Kuznets adds-16-
up comprehensive figures on wages, salaries, profitsand other sources of
income and calculates national income, which in his conceptual framework is
identical to net national product. Consumer expenditures are then calculated
in a somewhat roundabout way. Kuznets forms direct estimates of the flow of
commodities to consumers. The flow of services to consumers is calculated as
the residual between national income and independent estimates of all the
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components of NNP except consumer expenditures on services. Thus, the
individual components of Kuznetsts GNP series are designed to add up to total
national income. Hence, when the Kendrick correction factors are added to each
component, the resulting aggregate series is essentially a revised version of
Kuznets's national income estimates.
This fact argues in favor of the Kendrick series because the Kuznets
national income figures are very highly regarded. In his 1941 study on nation-
al income, Kuznets amasses an extensive array of income data. These data come
primarily from reports of the Internal Revenue Service and are based on federal
income tax returns. Kuznets supplements these data with independent estimates
of those components of national income not covered by the federal income tax
and hence not available from the IRS. The quality of the available income data
appears to be quite high and Kuznets is meticulous in aggregatingthe available
individual series in a sensible way. As a result, the Kuznets national income
series is almost surely quite accurate and free of systematicbiases.'2 Since
the Kendrick series is based almost entirely on this Kuznets series after 1919,
it too is likely to be very accurate.
As described above, the quality of the consumption data after 1919 is not
a crucial issue. While the consumption series is the prime source of the
discrepancy between the Kendrick and the Commerce Department series, this
finding could be due to the fact that the Kuznets series underlying the—17—
Kendrick series is calculated as a residual. The more important point is that
the total Kuznets GNP estimates underlying the Kendrick series derive all of
their annual movements from the very accurate Kuznets estimates of national
income.
The same is not true, however, of the estimates before 1919. For the
decade 1909-1918, the Kuznets estimates of GNP are derived using product-side
estimates of the components of GNP. Since total GNP is no longer derived from
the very accurate national income data, it is important to examine the methods
used to derive the key consumption series.
The Kuznets consumption series for 1909-1918 is derived from data on the
output of final commodities valued in producer prices. The flow of goods to
consumers is estimated by essentially scaling up the commodity output series by
13 . . afixed ratio. The flow of services to consumers is estimated using a
regression technique. In a period where good data exist on expenditures on
services and commodity output (Kuznets uses the period 1919-1941), Kuznets
estimates the relationship between the deviations from trend of the two series.
The parameter estimates are then used to form new estimates of services flow
for 1909-1918.
As discussed in Romer (1986b) these methods for estimating consumption are
likely to yield a series that is excessively volatile. The methods assume that
GNP moves approximately one-for-one with commodity output, when, in fact, GNP
is less cyclically sensitive than commodity output. Despite this flaw, the
Kuznets consumption series appears to be more accurate than the Commerce
Department series. Kuznets's consumption estimates for 1909-1918 almost
certainly capture the direction of annual movements correctly. For every
period for which we have data, consumer expenditures on goods and services move
in the same direction as commodity output when compared at the disaggregate-18-
level. This relationship is certainly preserved using Kuznets's methods for
estimating consumption. It is not preserved, however, in the Commerce Depart-
ment consumption estimates. In some years, such as 1918, Commerce Department
estimates of consumption move counter to the Kuznets estimates and to data on
commodity output. Provided the commodity output data are correct (as I suggest
is true in Romer, 1986a), this lack of correspondence is evidence that the
Commerce Department series is flawed.
Behavior. The final way of evaluating whether the Kuznets or Commerce
Department consumption estimates are more accurate is to compare the two series
in a period when they are most different to see if one set of estimates is more
plausible than another. As can be seen in Figure 1, the best period for
comparison is the era surrounding the 1921 recession when the Kuznets and
Commerce Department consumption estimates move in vastly different directions.
Using Commerce Department data, consumer expenditures fall noticeably between
1919 and 1920 and stay low in 1921. Consumption then recovers dramatically in
1922. In the Kuznets numbers, total consumer expenditures grow quite steadily
over the period.
The Kuznets and the Commerce Department estimates of consumption at the
minor components level for 1919-1922 are given in Table 4. In this exercise I
use the Kuznets series without the Kendrick revisions because the Kendrick
revisions are not available at this disaggregate a level. This procedure
should yield relevant comparisons because the Kendrick corrections to consump-
tion are very smooth and not correlated with the business cycle.
The disaggregate data show that the source of the behavior of the Commerce
Department series is quite implausible. Consumption falls between 1919 and
1920 not because of a fall in expenditures on durable or nondurable goods, but
because expenditures on services fall drastically. Similarly, consumption-19-
rises in 1922 partly because services recover to their 1919 level. This
behavior of services is very implausible. In the postwar era services are by
far the most stable component of consumption.14 Not only do services never
fall In the period after 1947, they barely deviate from avery predictable
growth rate. Hence, it is hard to believe that the Commerce Department esti-
mates of total consumption are correct)5
The behavior of consumption in the Kuznets series in the 1921 recession is
much more plausible. Consumer expenditures on durable goods fall by 19percent
between 1920 and 1921. Total consumption nevertheless rises because expendi-
tures on nondurables and services rise steadily. This behavior of consumption
during a recession is much more in accordance with postwar experience. Because
the Kuznets estimates of consumption are far more plausible than the Commerce
Department estimates in the period when they differ most, it seems reasonable
to believe that they are in general the better estimates. Hence, the Kendrick
series that is based on the final Kuznets consumption series should bepre-
ferred to the Commerce Department series.
Comparison with Other Cyclical Indicators
In addition to analyzing which relative price series is more appropriate
and which consumption series is more reliable, there is one lastway of evalu-
ating whether the Kendrick or Commerce Department GNP Series is more accurate.
One can compare the two series to other cyclical indicators to see which is
more consistent with these indicators. Of course, in making these comparisons
one must be careful to assess whether the series being used for comparison are
themselves accurate.
From the differences between the Kendrick and Commerce Department real GNP
series given in Table 1 it is clear that the most useful period to make such
comparisons is again 1918-1921. It is during World War I and its aftermath-20-
that the two series diverge most noticeably in their annual movements. The
Kendrick series shows a much smaller boom in output in 1918 and 1919 and a much
milder recession in 1920 and 1921 than does the Commerce Department series.
Hence, it is useful to see which picture of this four-year period is confirmed
by other accurate indexes of output.
Table S shows the level of real GNP in the Kendrick and Commerce Depart-
ment real GNP series in 1918-1921. It also shows the behavior of five other
cyclical indicators: the Shaw series on real commodity output, the Fabricant
index of manufacturing output, the Federal Reserve Board index of industrial
production, the Lebergott unemployment series, and the Romer unemployment
series. Since the various alternative indicators show different correspon-
dences with the Kendrick and Commerce Department GNP series, it is useful to
discuss briefly the behavior of each series and its likely degree of accuracy.
First, the Shaw commodity output series confirms the behavior of the
Kendrick GNP series. Commodity output falls 6 percent between 1919 and 1921
while GNP falls 4 percent using the Kendrick series and 15 percent using the
Commerce Department series. Since GNP contains several components of total
output, such as services and distribution, that are less cyclically sensitive
than the output of goods, one would expect GNP to move less over the cycle than
commodity output. Hence the behavior of the commodity output series is much
more consistent with the behavior of the Kendrick GNP series than with the
Commerce Department GNP series.
This high level of consistency between the Kendrick and Shaw series is
important because the Shaw series appears to be quiteaccurate.16 As I have
discussed in detail elsewhere (see Romer 1986a, pp. 330-331), the Shaw series
is based on a massive array of base data. Most importantly, it is based on
data on the value of both simple manufactured goods and highly fabricated-21-
commodities. As a result, it should represent cyclical more accurately than a
series that, say, overrepresents primary commodities.
The behavior of the Kendrick GNP series also appears to be confirmed by
the Fabricant series on manufacturing production. The fall in the Fabricant
series between 1919 and 1921 is 13 percent. While this is substantially larger
than the fall in the Kendrick series, it is also somewhat smaller than the fall
in the Commerce Department GNP series. Since one would certainly expect
manufacturing production to be more volatile than total GNP, these relative
declines suggest that the Fabricant series is more consistent with the Kendrick
series than with the Commerce Department series.
This is important because there is reason to believe that the Fabricant
series is quite accurate. The Fabricant estimates are only available biennial-
ly because they are based almost entirely on data from the Census of
factures. Since the Census data are very extensive and since Fabricant's
compilation of these data is very careful, it seems likely that these estimates
of manufacturing production measure the downturn of 1921 accurately.17
The behavior of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) index of industrial
production is very different from that of the Shaw and Fabricant production
indexes. The FRB index falls a precipitous 21 percent between 1919 and 1921.
From this one would be tempted to conclude that the FRB index confirms the
behavior of the Commerce Department GNP series which also shows a drastic
decline between 1919 and 1921.
However, there is reason to believe that the FRB index overstates the size
of business cycles in the pre-World War II period. While it has not been
carefully researched, the prewar FRB index appears to be based very heavily on
materials and primary commodities. Since such commodities tend to move more
over the cycle than do more finished goods, the FRB index may overstate the-22-
size of the 1921 downturn (see Romer, 1986a). If this is indeed the case, then
the correspondence between the Commerce Department and the Federal Reserve
Board series is evidence that the Commerce Department series is flawed.
The behavior of the Lebergott unemployment rate also suggests that 1919
was a very extreme boom and 1921 was a deep recession. This again would seem
to endorse the portrayal of World War I and its aftermath given in the Commerce
Department GNP series. However, as in the case of the FRB index, there is
evidence that the Lebergott index is not accurate. As discussed in Romer
(1986c) the Lebergott series exaggerates both booms and recessions because the
labor force is assumed to be invariant to the cycle and employment is assumed
to move one-for-one with output.
The Romer unemployment rate series given in Table 5 corrects the Lebergott
series for the average degree of cyclical exaggeration. This series shows
unemployment in 1919 and 1921 to be much less extreme than it appears to be in
the Lebergott series, but still relatively high in 1921. However, even this
series may exaggerate the level of unemployment in 1921 because the labor force
may have contracted more severely in 1921 than in other downturns. This is
true because temporary wartime workers still in the economy in 1921 may have
decided to leave the labor force.'8 Thus, the true unemployment rate would
probably show that the 1921 depression was quite mild. This fact suggests that
reasonable estimates of the unemployment rate in 1919-1921 confirm the behavior
of the Kendrick GNP series for this period.
In general, this comparison of the Kendrick and Commerce Department real
GNP series with other cyclical indicators for the years around World War I
shows that the Kendrick series is more accurate. The three alternative series
that are reliable confirm the behavior of the Kendrick series. Only the two-23-
series whose accuracy is highly suspect confirm the behavior of theCommerce
Department series.
IV. IMPROVED COMMERCE CONCEPT GNP ESTIMATES FOR 1909-1928
The previous sections have shown that there are substantialdifferences
between the Kendrick and the Commerce Department GNP series for1909-1928 and
that the Kendrick series is the better one to use. Given that thisis the
case, it is useful to present the Kendrick series in a form that is as accurate
and as convenient to use as possible. The most importantimprovement that
needs to be made concerns the decade 1909-1918. Because theunderlying Kuznets
data for this period are excessively volatile, the Kendrickseries also exag-
gerates the size of cyclical fluctuations. However, it is relativelystraight-
forward to improve the Kendrick series. While the traditional KuznetsGNP
series for 1909-1918 is based on excessively volatile product-sidedata, there
exist relatively unused Kuznets income-side estimates of GNP. Withsome
transformation, these more accurate estimates can be used in the derivation of
the Kendrick series. Hence, one can form a revised version of Kendrick'sGNP
series for 1909-1918 that represents cyclical movements moreaccurately and
that is more conceptually consistent with his series for 1919-1928.
New Kuznets Income-side Estimates of GNP
The first step in forming an improved Kendrick GNP series is to convert
the Kuznets income-side estimates of GNP for 1909-1918 into a usable form.
This is necessary because the income-side GNP series for this decadegiven in
Capital in the American Economy (1961) is derived in a somewhat flawed manner.
To derive his income-side GNP series Kuznets starts with preliminary dataon
nominal national income. These data were calculated as part of Kuznets's study
on National Product in Wartime (1945) and an unpublished study of national-24-
income in the early 1910s conducted by the National Bureau. These estimates of
national income are based on roughly the same methods used to derive the
Kuznets national income series after 1919. The estimates before 1919, however,
are probably less accurate than the later estimates simply because data on
various types of income are less plentiful before World War I.
Specifically, because of the lack of some types of income data, the
preliminary national income series appears to underestimate the level and the
trend growth rate of national product in this time period. To deal with this,
Kuznets essentially scales up these estimates of nominal national income by the
ratio of net national product to national income in the period 1919—1923. In
calculating this ratio, Kuznets does not use his standard estimates of national
income (which for some variants should be identical to NNP) but rather uses a
version based only on data that are also available for the earlier decade.'9
After scaling up national 'income by this ratio, Kuznets then multiplies the
resulting NNP series by a constant so that the decadal average of this series
is identical to that of his product-side estimates. The resulting nominal NIIP
series is transformed into a real series by means of a simple price index.
Real and nominal gross national product are calculated by adding real and
nominal estimates of capital consumption to the corresponding NNP series.
The resulting Kuznets income-side GNP series has both some distinct
benefits and some distinct flaws. The main benefit of the series is that it
appears to represent cycles more accurately than do the Kuznets product-side
estimates of GNP. While the income-side series is rough, Kuznets believed that
it was free of the excess volatility that characterizes the product-side
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series.
The main flaws in the Kuznets income-side series are two. First, the
method used to adjust the trend level of national income to form reasonable-25-
estimates of NNP is imprecise. The two-step procedure is cumbersome and
amounts to just scaling up national income by a fixed ratio. This is not a
desirable procedure because it does not allow the trend of NNP to differ from
the trend of the preliminary national income series. This is important because
the product-side estimates of NNP have a much steeper trend than the prelimi-
nary national income series and according to Kuznets, the representation of
trends in the product-side series is more accurate.
The second flaw in the derivation of the income-side GNP estimates is that
the price index used to deflate NNP is very crude. Kuznets uses a price index
that is just a simple weighted average of a rough consumer price index and two
individual price series. This price series is quite different from the implic-
it price deflator for his product—side NNP series. Since the latter series is
derived using much more disaggregate price data, it is impossible to justify
using the crude aggregate price index instead.
Since the basic idea of using the national income data is good, it is
useful to correct the flaws associated with the transformation of the income
data into sensible estimates of nominal and real NNP. To do this I form new
estimates of NNP using the following procedure. From the excessively volatile
but otherwise accurate product-side estimates of NNP in current prices, I
calculate trend NNP for 1909-1918. Using the same method I calculate the trend
of nominal national income.I then assume that the percentage deviations from
trend of NNP are identical to those of national income. These percentage
deviations are added to trend NNP to yield estimates of the annual level of NNP
in current prices.
This procedure should yield a new series that measures both the trend and
annual movements of NNP quite accurately. The product-side estimates of NNP
appear to provide a very good estimate of the trend of NNP. The national-26-
income series appears to provide a good estimate of annual deviations of total
product from trend. The procedure I use takes the best of both series to
derive new estimates of NNP. The most important characteristic of this series
is that the cyclical movements in NNP come entirely from independent estimates
of national income. As a result, the new series should be free of the excess
volatility that characterizes the standard product-side Kuznets estimates for
1909—1918.
The specifics of the procedure I use are quite straightforward. First,
the interpolation of the deviations from trend of N}TP by the deviations from
trend of national income is done in current rather than constant dollars. It
is useful to note that it should not matter whether the interpolation is done
in real or nominal terms because the same price index is appropriate for both
the product-side and income-side series.
Second, I calculate trend values of net national product and national
income by drawing a straight line between the logarithms of the two series in
the years 1910 and 1918.21 The years 1910 and 1918 were chosen as benchmark
observations because they appear to correspond to times when the economy was at
full but not overfull employment. This is important because the Kuznets
product-side estimates of NNP are only accurate when the economy is on trend,
rather than above or below it.22
Having calculated trend values, I use the difference between logarithms to
calculate the percentage deviations from trend of national income. I then
interpolate the deviations from trend of NNP by the deviations from trend of
national income, using the assumption that the two series move together
one-for-one in nominal terms. This assumption is valid because in the Kuznets
conceptual framework the two series should be identical.-27-
Theseprocedures yield a new series on nominal NNP that derives its annual
movements from national income. To form estimates of real NNP I deflate the
nominal estimates by the implicit price deflator for the Kuznets product-side
series on NNP. This deflator series appears to be quite accurate despite the
excess volatility of the product-side series. The reason for this is that the
real and nominal NNP estimates are similarly biased.23 The new real and
nominal estimates of NNP are then converted into estimates of GNP by adding in
Kuznets's estimates of capital consumption valued in current and constant
dollars. These estimates are available from the unpublished tablesunderlying
Capital in the American Economy and appear to be quite accurate.
The resulting new real and nominal income-side estimates of Kuznets
concept GNP for 1909-1918 are given in Table 6. The conventional Kuznets
income- and product-side series are also reported in Table 6. From these
comparisons several characteristics of the new income-side estimates are
apparent. First, the new estimates are quite different from the Kuznets
income-side series. The two nominal series differ most noticeably in their
representation of the trend of GNP. As one would expect, cyclical movements
are essentially identical. The two income-side series are closer in real
values than nominal values. This somewhat anomalous result is due to the fact
that flaws in the deflator series used by Kuznets happen to compensate for some
of the discrepancy between the trends of the two nominal series.
The new income-side estimates are also different from the Kuznets
product-side estimates. While the trends of both the real and nominal series
are identical by construction, the cyclical movements of the series are quite
different. The two series generally move in the same direction, but the
Kuznets product-side series consistently shows more extreme movements.24-28-
Revised Kendrick Series
Having created new income-side estimates of GNP for 1909-1918, it is
useful to incorporate these estimates into the Kendrick series. Doing so
should yield a Commerce concept GNP series that represents cycles correctly in
the 1910s as well as the 1920s.
Actually incorporating the new estimates into the Kendrick series is
straightforward. Kendrick (1961) shows what changes need to be made to convert
each of the components of the standard Kuznets series into a Commerce concept
GNP series. The changes are for the most part quite minor. For consumption,
one must subtract off personal tax and nontax payments (which is the way
Kuznets values the flow of government services to consumers) and add in the
value of the unpaid services of financial intermediaries. For investment, one
must subtract off public investment from the Kuznets estimates. Finally, to
these revised Kuznets estimates of consumption and investment one must add
total government expenditures to create a Commerce concept GNP series.
The only problem involved in applying the Kendrick correction factors to
the new income-side estimates is that the new series only provides estimates of
GNP, not of the components of GNP. However, from the description of the
necessary changes, it should be clear that this is not an obstacle. The
changes that need to be made are not dependent on the particular Kuznets
consumption or investment series used. Rather, they will apply to any Kuznets
concept GNP series. Hence, to convert the new income-side estimates of Kuznets
concept GNP into Commerce concept estimates, one simply needs to add in the net
value of the additions and subtractions given by Kendrick.25
Once the correction factors have been added on to the new Kuznets concept
income-side estimates of GNP, the resulting revision of Kendrickts GNP series
for 1909-1918 can then be combined with the unrevised Kendrick estimates for-29-
1919-1928. The series for the 1910s and 1920s are consistent because the
Kendrick estimates for 1919-1928 are based on the standard Kuznets GNP esti-
mates which, like the revised series, are derived using theincome-payments
approach.
Having corrected the excess volatility of the original Kendrick series for
1909-1918, the only step that remains is to ratio splice the real and nominal
series to the Commerce Department series in 1929. For the nominal Kendrick
series, the ratio splice makes the Kendrick series identical to the Commerce
Department series in 1929. This is useful because the two series differ
slightly in levels in this year (GNP in 1929 is $103.9 billion in the Commerce
Department series and $104.4 billion in the Kendrick series). For the real
Kendrick series, the ratio splice makes it possible tocompare the Commerce
Department series valued in 1982 dollars to the revised Kendrick series valued
in 1929 dollars. As discussed in detail in Section II, ratiosplicing at the
aggregate level does not genuinely convert the revised Kendrick series to a
1982 base year because 1929 prices are still used to weight the variouscompo-
nents of GNP. However, it does allow users of the two series to calculate
percentage changes and deviations from trend very easily.
The resulting substantially revised version of Kendrick's series isgiven
in Table 7. Table 7 shows both the nominal and real versions of this new
Commerce concept GNP series. It also reports the resulting implicit price
deflator.
V. THE EFFECT OF USING TIlE REVISED ESTIMATES OF GNP
Having derived a greatly revised version of Kendrick's estimates of GNP
for 1909-1928, the obvious question is, does it matter whether one uses this
series in place of the standard Commerce Department series or in place of the-30-
standard Kendrick series? To answer this question It is useful to compare the
three series. This is done in Table 8 which shows the level of GNP in 1982
dollars in the revised Kendrick GNP series, the standard Commerce Department
series, and the standard Kendrick series, and in Figure 2 which graphs the
annual percentage changes of the revised Kendrick series and the Commerce
Department series over the period 1909-1928.
Table 8 makes clear that the revised Kendrick series I present for
1909-1928 is identical to the standard Kendrick series beginning in 1919.
Because one of the main conclusions of this research is that the Kendrick
series after 1919 is both better than the Commerce Department series and very
good in an absolute sense, I do not revise this series in any way. Table 8
also shows that the revised series for 1909-1918 is quite different from the
standard Kendrick series. Improving the Kuznets data underlying the Kendrick
series yields a revised GNP series for 1909-1918 that is in general less
volatile than the standard Kendrick series.26 This difference in volatility is
most noticeable in the recessions of 1914 and 1917. In both these years real
GNP falls much more in the standard Kendrick series than in the revised esti-
mates. The difference in the two series in 1917 has the effect of making the
boom in output associated with World War I appear to be somewhat smaller in the
revised estimates.
Table 8 and Figure 2 also indicate that the revised Kendrick series is
very different from the standard Commerce Department GNP series. During the
1910s, the most obvious difference between the two series is that the wartime
boom is vastly larger in the Commerce Department series than in the revised
Kendrick series (or than in the standard Kendrick series). During the 1920s,
the revised series, which is identical to the standard Keridrick series, shows
much milder annual movements than does the Commerce Department series. This-31—
difference is seen most dramatically in the years 1919-1922. The depression of
1921 is much more severe in the Commerce Department series than in therevised
estimates.
As a general matter using the revised estimates of GNP inempirical
research is likely to lead to quite different results thanusing the official
Commerce Department series. The two series show such differentannual move-
ments that any study of prewar cyclical behavior is bound to bevery sensitive
to which series is used. Because the revised estimatesarea also quite differ-
ent from the standard Kendrick series in the 1910s, empirical studiescould
also be sensitive to which of these two series is used.
In addition to generally affecting macroeconomic researchon the prewar
era, using the revised GNP estimates for 1909-1928 in place of the Commerce
Department series provides a new view of two key historical episodes in this
period. The revised Kendrick GNP series paints a much differentpicture of the
effect of World War I on the economy and the severity of the 1921depression
than does the Commerce Department GNP series. These differentportrayals
suggest new interpretations of these important events.
Effect of World War I
The revised estimates of GNP suggest that World War I had much less effect
on total output than is generally believed. Whereas the Commerce Department
series shows real GNP rising by 17 percent between 1917 and 1918, the revised
Kendrick series shows GNP rising by only 5 percent in the sameperiod. The
standard Kendrick series also shows that the effect of World War Ion the
economy is quite small, though somewhat larger than is suggested by the revised
estimates. The Kendrick real GNP series rises 9 percent between 1917 and 1918.
As discussed earlier, much of the difference between the two Kendrick
series and the Commerce Department is due to the fact that the Commerce-32-
Department series uses 1982 relative prices to weight the components of GNP
while the two versions of the Kendrick series use 1929 relative prices. The
estimates based on 1929 relative prices clearly provide a more accurate indica-
tion of how the war affected the economy than do the estimates based on 1982
prices. Because relative prices during the war are much more similar to those
in 1929 than in 1982, the 1929 base series provides a real GNP series that is
weighted by prices that more clearly reflect the relative price of different
goods during World War i.27If one believes that the relative price of a good
reflects the drain on resources and the contribution to society of that good,
then a series based on 1929 relative prices will provide a better indication of
how wartime mobilization affected both the production and consumption of the
economy.
The discussion of Section IV also suggests that the revised version of the
Kendrick series is more accurate than the standard Kendrick series. Because
the revised estimates are based on Kuznets's income-side measures of GNP, these
estimates should be free of the excess volatility present in the standard
Kendrick series which is based on the Kuznets product-side estimates of GNP.
Given that the revised GNP estimates provide a more accurate indication of
total output during World War I, it is possible to conclude that World War I
only produced a mild upswing in total production. Because total output did not
rise significantly in the presence of large increases in government spending,
it is clear that the production of war-related goods must have primarily
substituted for consumer and business investment goods. This effect can be
quantified by examining the ratio of the change in real GNP to the change in
real government spending. For the revised Kendrick estimates this ratio is
.38.28 This suggests that only slightly over a third of military production-33-
was met by new production while close to two-thirds came from a decrease in
private consumption.
This finding is very different from those derived using either the Com-
merce Department or the standard Kendrick series. The ratio of the change in
real GNP to the change in real government spending is .79 using the Commerce
Department series and .64 using the standard Kendrick series. Both these
series contribute to the inaccurate perception that the majority of wartime
production came from additional output. Interestingly, the amount of military
production accounted for by a decrease in consumption indicated by the revised
estimates is very similar to that estimated by Clark (1931). Clark finds that
only 41 percent of military production came from additional production, while
59 percent came from consumer retrenchment. 29
The view that World War I had little effect on total production is in fact
consistent with much of what is known about the economy at the time.3° First,
it is widely agreed that there were few unemployed resources available at the
start of the war. For example, both the Romer and Lebergott unemployment
series show that the unemployment rate in 1916 and 1917 was approximately at
its long-run average level. (The unemployment rate in 1917 was 4.6 percent
according to the Lebergott series and 5.2 percent according to the Romer
series.)
Second, there is little evidence that either productivity or the labor
force increased substantially during the war. For example, there are very few
technological innovations that one would associate with the wartime period.
Furthermore, Lebergott finds no evidence that women were drawn into the labor
force in World War I as they were in World War II. While Lebergott almost
surely misses some additional workers, he is probably correct that the produc-
tive capacity of the labor force did not increase markedly in this period.31- 34.-
The moderate rise in the number of people in the labor force during the war
probably only offset the productivity loss associated with the drafting of
millions of prime age male workers. As a result, the U.S. faced a capacity
constraint which forced wartime production to substitute for private consuinp-
tion rather than to augment total production substantially.
This portrayal of World War I as a period when capacity constraints
prevented a large rise in GNP runs counter to the usual view that major wars
invariably cause large booms in output. Indeed, it may serve to highlight just
how unusual the response of the economy to World War II actually was. Only
when the economy begins a war with unemployed resources or is able to greatly
increase productivity or the labor force will large increases in military
spending be met by an increase in production rather than by a decrease in
consumption. These conditions were clearly met during World War II, and as a
result 85 percent of the increase in government spending between 1941 and 1944
(valued in 1982 dollars) came from additional output. However, it is quite
possible that other wars in American history follow more closely the pattern of
World War I.
The Severity of the 1921 Depression
While the revised estimates of real GNP provide a different view of the
effect of World War I on the economy than do either the standard Kendrick
estimates or the official Commerce Department series, the revised and standard
Kendrick numbers are identical after 1919. Nevertheless, this endorsement of
the standard Kendrick series in place of the Commerce Department series turns
out to be very important. Specifically, using the Kendrick estimates of GNP
provides a reevaluation of the severity of the 1921 postwar depression. In the
official Commerce Department series, real GNP falls 8 percent between 1919 and
1920 and another 7 percent between 1920 and 1921. In both the revised and-35-
standard Kendrick estimates, real GNP falls only 1 percent between 1919 and
1920, and 2 percent between 1920 and 1921.32 Because the Kendrick and Commerce
Department series yield such different portrayals of this time period, it is
important to see how using the more accurate Kendrick estimates alters our
interpretation of this recession.
The downturn of 1921 is conventionally attributed to a decline inaggre-
gate demand.33 Private consumers and producers supposedly contributed to this
decline in 1921 by overspending on durable goods right after thewar. As a
result, by 1921 their demand was satiated and the stock of durables wasvery
young, so they greatly curtailed their spending on these goods. The Federal
Reserve Board is thought to have caused a further fall inaggregate demand by
allowing the money supply to contract sharply between 1920 and 1921. Available
evidence confirms the view that aggregate demand declined substantially between
1920 and 1921. For example, the Kuznets consumption figures given in Table 4
show a 21 percent drop in consumer spending on durable goods in thisperiod.
Furthermore, estimates of the money supply show that Ml fell 10 percent between
1020 and 1921.
In the conventional story this fall in aggregate demand is supposed to
have caused a large fall in output because prices did not adjust instantaneous-
ly. The fall in output is then supposed to have generated unemployment which
drove down wages and prices substantially. The actual fall in prices that this
movement in output is supposed to account for is very large. For example, the
implicit price deflator for GNP given in Table 7 fell 16 percent between 1920
and 1921. Similarly, the Bureau of Labor Statistics wholesale price index fell
46 percent between 1920 and 1921.
From the discussion of the behavior of the revised and standard Kendrick
GNP series in this period, it is clear that this traditional interpretation of-36-
1921 no longer makes sense. Despite a substantial fall in aggregate demand,
total GNP barely falls at all between 1919 and 1921. Furthermore, as discussed
in Section III, it is unlikely that unemployment rose substantially in 1921
either. As a result, it is impossible to argue that it was a decline in
production and employment that drove down wages and prices in this period.
Since the conventional explanation for the behavior of the economy in 1921
can no longer explain the facts we observe, it is useful to suggest alternative
explanations. The fact that large movements in aggregate demand in 1921 were
associated with very small movements in GNP and very large movements in prices
seems to indicate that supply factors were particularly important in this
period. Indeed, this pattern of behavior is consistent with either a very
steep aggregate supply curve or the presence of beneficial supply shocks in
1921. While it is clearly outside the scope of this study to prove that a
particular alternative hypothesis is correct, it is possible to provide some
information about both these hypotheses.
First, nearly all conventional estimates of the slope of the Phillips
curve in this period suggest that the aggregate supply curve was far from
vertical (see, for example, Gordon 1980 and 1982, and Schultze, 1981). Howev-
er, this evidence is not conclusive because all of these studies are estimated
using excessively volatile GNP data. As a result, they are likely to yield a
slope coefficient that is biased downward. If the bias is severe, the aggre-
gate supply curve for the prewar era may be substantially steeper than is
conventionally believed.
Second, there may also be some evidence that positive supply shocks
occurred in this period. A study of the 1920s by George Soule (1947) argues
that the availability of agricultural goods increased greatly in 1921. This
occurred both because domestic agricultural production was high in 1921 and—37—
because large stocks of agricultural goods that had been accumulating in
nonbelligerent nations during the war began entering the U.S. market in 1920
and 1921. These goods had been accumulating in the producing countries because
the foreign ships customarily used to transport the goods were involved in
wartime activities. By 1920, the European and American shipping industries had
been restored and these goods could enter the market.
This large increase in the supply of agricultural goods would normally be
expected to lower the price of agricultural products. And, it is indeed the
case that the relative price of agricultural goods fell dramatically between
35 . . 1919and 1921. This fall in the price of agricultural products may have
stimulated the production of the many manufactured commodities that are based
on agricultural goods. Because the cost of materials declined, it is likely
that firms producing goods such as cotton and woolen textiles, boots and shoes,
and processed foods flourished in 1921. In this way, the agricultural supply
shock may have served to both reduce prices and stimulate production in 1921.
While much additional research needs to be done on the cause of the
dramatic deflation of 1921, the preceding discussion suggests that supply
factors were probably an important component. Although the fall in aggregate
demand surely contributed to the decline in wages and prices, it is probably
either the steepness of the aggregate supply curve or positive supply shocks
that can explain why prices fell so much and GNP declined so little in 1921.
This preliminary finding shows that, as was the case for World War I, substi-
tuting better GNP estimates for 1919-1921 for the official Commerce Department
series may greatly alter economists' interpretation of an important event in
the macroeconomic history of the United States.NOTES
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1For example, the Commerce Department series for 1909-1928 is used by
Gordon in the derivation of a quarterly GNP series that he uses to estimate
prewar Phillips curves (see Gordon, 1982). It is also used by Baily to argue
that prewar business cycles were more severe than postwar cycles (see Baily,
1978).
their 1972 paper Swanson and Williamson also propose using a slightly
revised version of the Kendrick/Kuznets GNP series as an alternative to the
Commerce Department series for 1919-1928. However, Swanson and Williamson do
not offer any reasons for preferring this series to the Commerce Department
series and fail to note that the behavior of the two series is very different
in the period 1919-1922.
3See Romer, 1986b.
4By ratio splice I mean that the series being adjusted is multiplied by
the ratio of the reference series to the series being adjusted for a particular
year. For example, to ratio splice the nominal Kendrick series (KEN) to the
nominal Commerce Department series (COM) I calculate:
CON1929 KEN
KEN1929
This yields an adjusted series that is identical to the Commerce Department
series in 1929.
5These changes can be seen by examining the implicit price deflators for
the components of the Commerce Department GNP series. In 1982 the ratio of the
implicit deflator for each series to the overall deflator is 1.00. In 1929 the
ratio of the deflator for consumption of durables to the overall deflator is
1.57, the ratio for consumption of services is 0.95 and the ratio for federal
government expenditures is 0.55.
6For a description of the virtues of chain weights (or at least changing
weights) see Kendrick, 1961, pp. 54-56 and 232-234.
7This can be seen by examining the implicit price deflator for the
components of the Kendrick GNP series. In 1929 the ratio of the implicit price
deflator for each series to the overall deflator is 1.00. In 1909 the ratio
for consumption expenditures is 1.02, for new construction and equipment is
0.92, and for government expenditures is 0.82.
8The estimates of consumer expenditures given in Dewhurst for 1909-1928
are somewhat different from those now available from the Commerce Department.This suggests that Kendrick made some alterations in the Dewhurstnumbers
before incorporating them in the Commerce Department series. Whilethe
Dewhurst and Commerce Department series are not identical, it isimportant to
note that basic movements in the series are similar. Forexample, the Dewhurst
series shows a drop in real consumption in 1921 as does the CommerceDepartment
series. This is in contrast to the Kendrick-Kuznets realconsumer expenditures
series which rises in 1921.
9The reference to "Commerce"is used by Dewhurst to differentiate one
Kuznets series on consumer expenditures from another. Kuznetscreated two
consumer expenditures series; one that was designed to matchup in levels to
the Department of Commerce series in 1929. This ispresumably the preliminary
series that Dewhurst reports.
10The numberseven differ substantially from estimates of GNP for 1919-
1928 given in Kuznets's 1946 book, National Product Since 1869.
Kuznets actually constructsthree variants of GNPandconsumer expendi-
tures. These series only differ in how the trend levels of thecomponents of
consumption are measured. In all three variants the annual movements in both
commodity flow and services flow are derived from the commodity and services
series described in the text. For a more thoroughexplanation of Kuznets's
procedures see Capital in the American Economy, Appendix A,pp. 465-504.
l2l is possible thatsome systematic bias could result from using income
data from tax records. If evasion is higher when income ishigh, this could
cause measured income to be too low in booms. However, because tax rateswere
in general very low and only mildly progressive in thepre-Worid War II period,
the incentive for such evasion should have been small. Asa result the Kuznets
series for 1919-1928 should be free of systematic errors.
3For a morethorough description of Kuznets's procedures see Romer,
1986b, pp. 7-11.
l4For adescription of the cyclical behavior of the components of con-
sumption see Hall and Taylor, 1986, pp. 167-170.
15The aberrant behavior ofthe Commerce Department services series could
be due to the way the series is constructed. While wepossess no documentation
on the Commerce Department series, it is conceivable that the services series
is calculated as a residual and hence may include movements notactually
related to expenditures on services. However, the Kuznets services series
which is certainly calculated as a residual never shows such implausibleor
dramatic movements. Hence it is unlikely that methodology canexplain much of
the unprecedented movement in the Commerce Department services series in 1920
and 1921.
is useful to point out that the consistency between the Kendrick and
Shaw series in 1919-1921 is in no sense present by construction. While the
Kuznets series on which the Kendrick series is based is derived from the Shaw
series before 1918, after 1919 it is derived from independent data on national
income.17Since I have argued that the Shaw and Fabricant series are both
accurate, it is important to explain why the behavior of the two series is
somewhat different. The Shaw series includes nonmanufactured foods while the
Fabricant series does not. Because of an agricultural boom in the immediate
postwar period, total commodity output does not fall as much as does manufac-
turing production.
movement will not be captured by either Romer's or Lebergott's
procedures. Lebergott makes no correction for the cyclical behavior of the
labor force and Romer only corrects for typical cyclical behavior. The argu-
ment that the labor force may have declined substantially in 1921 depends on
the possibility that some temporary workers are included in the Lebergott labor
force estimates which are calculated as a linear trend between Census years.
This is possible because 1920 is a benchmark year.
19See the notes to Table R-20 of Capital in the American Economy, 1961,p.
552.
20Kuznets certainly endorses the idea that the national income series
provides a more accurate representation of cyclical movements than do the
product side estimates of GNP. He states in Capital in the American Economy
that while "the estimates used here for 1909-1918 [the income-side estimates]
are probably subject to a wider margin of error than those for the years
beginning in 1919 ... itseemed preferable to make full use of the earlier
work at the National Bureau on the direct estimates of national income for
1909-1918 rather than substitute indirectly derived annual estimates" (Kuznets,
1961, pp. 535-536). The use to which Kuznets was putting the early income-side
series was the estimation of the cyclical relationship between real GNP and
real commodity output that he used to create his prewar regression series on
GNP.
21 . Incalculating trend values of NNP I use Kuznets s Variant III of net
national product. This variant is the one used by Kendrick in his derivation
of a Commerce concept GNP series. The trend value for 1909 is calculated by
continuing the line between 1910 and 1918 back one year.
22For a more thorough explanation of why these benchmark observations are
accurate see Romer, 1986b, pp. 28-29.
is perhaps useful to explain how the Kuznets implicit price deflator
is derived. As in modern data, it is technically calculated as the ratio of
NTNP valued in current dollars to NNP valued in 1929 dollars. However, the
constant dollar NNP series is calculated by deflating the nominal NNP series at
the disaggregate level using a variety of price indexes. Hence, the implicit
price deflator for the aggregate series it just a weighted average of the
plethora of individual price series used in the deflating process.
24This can be quantified by comparing the standard deviation of the
percentage changes of each series. This measure for the new income-side
estimates in 1929 dollars for 1910-1918 is 4.6 percent while for the Kuznets
product-side estimates in 1929 dollars it is 6.3 percent.
25Because the net Kendrick correction factors are available in both
current and 1929 dollars, they can be added on to the nominal and real Kuznetsincome-side estimates independently. This allows the government expenditure
series to have a price deflator different from that of total nongovernment GNP.
26This difference involatility can be quantified by comparing the
standard deviations of the percentage changes of the two series. The standard
deviation of the standard Kendrick series for 1910-1928 is 0.050 while that for
the revised series is 0.037.
27The greater similarity between relativeprices in 1918 and 1929 than
between 1918 and 1982 can be seen by examining the implicit price deflators for
the components of the Commerce Department GNP series. In 1982 the ratio of the
implicit price deflator for each series to the overall deflator is 1.00. In
1929 the ratio of the deflator for consumption of durables to the overall
deflator is 1.57, the ratio for consumption of services is 0.95, and the ratio
for federal government expenditures is 0.55. In 1918 the ratio of the deflator
for consumption of durables to the overall deflator is 1.93, the ratio for the
consumption of services is 0.77, and the ratio for federal government purchases
28In this calculation Iuse the standard Kendrick estimates of government
expenditures valued in 1929 dollars (see Kendrick, 1961, Table A-ha, p. 294)
and the revised version of the Kendrick estimates of real GNP derived in
Section IV, also valued in 1929 dollars.
29For a discussion of Clarksfinding, see Studeaski and Krooss, 1963, p.
301.
30For a usefulsummary of the response of the economy to war mobilization
see Hughes, 1987, pp. 413-427.
31See Lebergott, 1964,pp. 395-397. Lebergott may have underestimated the
effect of the war on the labor force because his method of estimating the labor
force involves interpolating linearly between census estimates of gainful
workers in 1910 and 1920. If wartime workers were still in the economy in
1920, then some of the apparent trend growth of the labor force may have in
fact been temporary growth due to the war.
is useful to note that this difference in the rate of decline in the
two series is not simply due to the fact that the wartime boom is higher in the
Commerce Department series than in the new series. While it is true that GNP
is substantially higher in the Commerce Department series than in the new
series in 1919, it is also substantially lower in the Commerce Department
series than in the new series in 1921.
33For a concise exposition of the standard explanation of the 1921
depression see Lewis, 1949, pp. 18-20.
34Data on Ml are from Historical Statistics, 1975, series X414,p. 992.
35The ratio of the wholesale price index for farm products to that of
industrial commodities is 1.41 in 1919 and 0.97 in 1921. The data are from
Historical Statistics, 1975, series E24 and E25, p. 199.REFERENCES
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Percentage Difference Between Kendrick and Cmmerce Department





















































































































Sources: The Kendrick series is from Kendrick's book Productivity Trends
in the United States, 1961, Tables A-ha and A-hIb, pp. 293-297. The Commerce
Department series (on a 1982 base year) is currently unpublished but will be
available in subsequent editions of the National Income and Product Accounts.
apercentage differences are calculated as the difference in the logarithms
of the two GNP series.
b ,,.. . • •
Theterm aggregate indicates that the Kendrick series is ratio spliced
to the Commerce Department series at the level of total GNP.
cThe term "disaggregate" indicates that the Kendrick series is ratio spliced
to the Commerce Department series at the level of the major components
of GNP.TABLE 2
Percent of the Discrepancy between Kendrick and
a Commerce Department GNP Series Accounted for by Each Component
Change in Net
Consumer Fixed Business Foreign Government
Year Expenditures Investment Inventories Investment Expenditures
Current Dollarsb
1909 142 -35 -10 15 -11
1910 110 —6 —6 11 —9
1911 133 -2 -26 9 —15
1912 106 -3 3 7 —13
1913 251 -54 -78 11 -31
1914 89 10 5 8 -12
1915 188 10 7 —72 —33
1916 -64 -7 96 62 13
1917 —374 -151 287 266 71
1918 —720 -287 753 179 175
1919 140 22 -18 -27 -17
1920 160 42 -35 -39 -29
1921 80 -8 2 10 17
1922 124 22 -9 -1 -35
1923 37 215 -32 62 -182
1924 100 -8 -13 10 12
1925 111 7 —11 1 —8
1926 5 -3 54 22 —18
1927 -4 -40 94 20 30














1909 129 - 20 - 8 12 -13
1910 106 1 — 5 9
—11
1911 107 9 — 12 9
—13
1912 1Q3 6 -5 8 —13
1913 144 - 13 - 23 10 -18
1914 90 17 0 5
—12
1915 116 9 — 3 — 6 —15
1916 318 36 -155 - 62 —37
1917 152 52 - 56 - 38 —10
1918 104 40 - 55 - 14 25
1919 157 64 - 8 -132 17
1920 56 -122 24 115 27
1921 78 -17 -3 22 20
1922 103 142 8 - 79 -74
1923 154 -104 - 12 26 36
1924 125 - 39 - 13 14 13
1925 85 184 - 57 - 43 -69
1926 -276 238 113 51 —26
1927 193 - 54 13 - 47 —5
1928 126 - 43 13 - 5 10
Sources: The disaggregate Kendrick series are from Productivity Trends in the
United States, 1961, Tables Alla and AlIb, pp. 293-297. The disaggregate
Commerce Department series are from unpublished tables provided by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis.
aThe fractions are calculated as the difference between the Kendrick and
the Commerce Department Series at the components level divided by the total
difference.
bThe Kendrick series in current dollars is ratio spliced to the Commerce
Department series in current dollars at the level of the major components of
GNP.
cThe Kendrick series in 1929 dollars is ratio spliced to the Commerce
Department series in 1982 dollars at the level of the major components of GNP.TABLE 3
Fraction of GNP Accounted for by Selected Componentsa
of Kendrick and Commerce Department Series
COMMERCEDEPARTMENT
Consumer Expenditures Investment Government Expenditures
Year Current $1982$ Current$1982$ Current$1982$
1909 .78 .69 .14 .19 .05 .09
1910 .78 .69 .15 .21 .05 .09
1911 .79 .70 .14 .19 .06 .10
1912 .77 .68 .14 .20 .06 .10
1913 .79 .69 .15 .20 .06 .10
1914 .81 .71 .12 .17 .06 .11
1915 .77 .70 .11 .16 .06 .12
1916 .77 .69 .13 .18 .06 .10
1917 .75 .67 .12 .17 .09 .16
1918 .70 .57 .11 .12 .21 .33
1919 .68 .60 .11 .15 .11 .21
1920 .71 .64 .12 .17 .06 .12
1921 .77 .69 .12 .16 .08 .15
1922 .77 .68 .13 .19 .08 .13
1923 .73 .64 .16 .21 .07 .12
1924 .75 .66 .16 .21 .08 .13
1925 .73 .64 .16 .22 .08 .13
1926 .73 .63 .16 .22 .08 .12
1927 .74 .65 .16 .21 .09 .13
1928 .75 .66 .15 .20 .09 .14TABLE 3 (continued)
KENDRI CK
Consumer Expenditures Investment Government Expenditures
Year Current $1929$ Current$1929$ Current$1929$
1909 .75 .74 .16 .17 .06 .07
1910 .76 .74 .16 .18 .06 .07
1911 .77 .76 .14 .15 .07 .08
1912 .76 .74 .15 .16 .07 .08
1913 .75 .74 .16 .17 .06 .07
1914 .81 .79 .12 .13 .07 .08
1915 .77 .75 .11 .12 .07 .08
1916 .73 .72 .12 .13 .06 .07
1917 .74 .72 .11 .12 .09 .10
1918 .67 .66 .08 .08 .21 .22
1919 .67 .68 .11 .11 .12 .13
1920 .70 .72 .11 .12 .07 .08
1921 .79 .78 .10 .11 .09 .09
1922 .77 .77 .13 .14 .08 .08
1923 .74 .74 .15 .15 .07 .07
1924 .77 .77 .15 .15 .08 .08
1925 .74 .73 .16 .16 .08 .08
1926 .75 .74 .16 .16 .07 .08
1927 .75 .75 .15 .16 .08 .08
1928 .76 .76 .15 .15 .08 .08
Source: The disaggregate Commerce Department series is from unpublished tables
provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The Kendrick series is from
Productivity Trends in the United States, 1961, Tables A-ha and A-hIb,
pp. 293-297.
aThe fraction of GNP accounted for by the change in business inventories
and net foreign investment are not reported. These components consistently
account for less that 2 percent of GNP and are not sensitive to the use of
current versus constant dollars.NONDURABLE S
Sources: The Kuznets data are from unpublished tables underlying Capital in
the American Economy, 1961. The Commerce Department data are also based on
unpublished data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
aNondurables in the Kuznets data are calculated as the sum of perishables
and semidurables. In these calculations I use Variant III of the Kuznets
estimates.
TABLE 4




Year (1929$) (1982$) (1929$)a(1982$) (1929$) (1982 $)
1919 5.368 22.152 26.180 140.614 20.657 155.143
1920 5.297 22.154 26.365 143.411 22.498 145.896
1921 4.293 17.584 28.396 149.559 24.281 144.330
1922 5.470 25.147 30.016 170;593 23.754 156.137TABLE 5
Comparison of Cyclical Indicators
1918-1922
Series 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922
Kendrick Real GNP 498.5 503.9 498.1 486.4 514.9
(billions of 1982 $)
CommerceDepartment Real GNP 570.0 528.3 487.1 452.8 519.6
(billions of 1982 $)
ShawCommodity Output Series 18.7 19.8 19.8 18.7 21.7
(billions of 1913 $)
FabricantManufacturing Index NA 61.0 NA 53.5 NA
(1929 =100)
Federal Reserve Board NA 14.0 14.7 11.3 14.4
Industrial Production Index
(1967 =100)
Lebergott Unemployment Rate 1.4 1.4 5.2 11.7 6.7
(percentages)
Romer Unemployment Rate 3.4 3.0 5.2 8.7 6.9
(percentages)
Sources: The Kendrick series is from Kendrick, 1961, Table A-ha, pp. 293-297.
The Commerce Department series is from unpublished tables provided by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. The Shaw commodity output series is from Shaw, 1947, Table
1.3, p. 77. Total commodity output is calculated as the sum of total finished
commodities and construction materials. The Fabricant series is from Fabricant,
1940, p. 602. The Federal Reserve Board Index is from Industrial Production,
1977, Table A-5, p. S-27. The Lebergott series is from Lebergott, 1961, Table
A-3, p. 512. The Romer series is from Romer, 1986c, Table 9, p. 31.TABLE 6



























































































Sources: For a description of the new income-side estimates see text. The
Kuznets income—side series (Variant III) is from Capital in the American
Economy, 1961, Table R-20, p. 552.I use unpublished Kuznets estimates of
capital consumption to report GNP estimates in greater detail. The nominal GNP
series is calculated by multiplying the final estimates of NNP by the price
index given in Table R-20 and then adding in nominal estimates of capital
consumption available from unpublished Kuznets tables. The Kuznets product-
side series (Variant III, components) is from unpublished tables underlying the


























































































Sources: See text for a description of the revised estimates.
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Sources: The Kendrick series is from Productivity Trends in the United States,
1961, Table A—ha, pp. 293—295. The Kendrick consumption series in 1929
dollars is spliced to the Commerce Department consumption series in 1982
dollars. The Commerce Department series is from unpublished tables provided
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Sources: For a description of the new Commerce concept GNPseriessee the
text. The official Commerce Department series (in 1982 $)iscurrently
unpublished, but will be available in future editions of the National Income
and Product Accounts of the United States.
aThe new estimates are formed by ratio splicing a revised version of the
Kendrick series in 1929 $tothe Conunerce Department series in 1982 $atthe
aggregate level. This yields a series that is roughly on a 1982 base, but
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